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Abstract 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a short measure of a person’s ability to resist intuitive 
response tendencies, and to produce a normatively correct response which is based on effortful 
reasoning. Although the CRT is a very popular measure, its psychometric properties have not been 
extensively investigated. A major limitation of the CRT is the difficulty of the items, which can lead to 
floor effects in populations other than highly educated adults. The present study aimed at investigating 
the psychometric properties of the CRT applying Item Response Theory (IRT) analyses (a 2-parameter 
logistic model) and at developing a  new version of the scale (the CRT-Long), which is appropriate for 
participants with both lower and higher levels of cognitive reflection. The results demonstrated the 
good psychometric properties of the original, as well as the new scale. The validity of the new scale 
was also assessed by measuring correlations with various indicators of intelligence, numeracy, 
reasoning and decision-making skills, and thinking dispositions.  Moreover, we present evidence for 
the suitability of the new scale to be used with developmental samples. Finally, by comparing the 
performance of adolescents and young adults on the CRT and CRT-Long, we report the first 
investigation into the development of cognitive reflection.  
Keywords: cognitive reflection; decision making; heuristics; item response theory; 
individual differences; test information function; validity. 
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Introduction 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a short test measuring a person’s 
tendency to override an intuitively compelling response, and to engage in further reflection which can 
lead to a correct solution. As an example, consider the following item: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in 
total.  The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.  How much does the ball cost? ______ cents. Although 
the correct response is 5 cents, many participants give the response “10 cents”, which seems to pop into 
mind effortlessly. Indeed, a remarkable property of the CRT is that for each item, almost all 
participants produce either the normatively correct response, or a typical incorrect (i.e., heuristic) 
response. That is, the reasoning errors that people make are very systematic. It has been proposed that 
because the heuristic response comes very quickly and easily (i.e., fluently) to mind, people will be 
highly confident that this answer is correct, and will be reluctant to revise it (cf. Thompson & 
Morsanyi, 2012). Indeed, De Neys, Rossi and Houdé (2013) found that people who gave the incorrect 
heuristic response to the bat and ball problem were 83% confident that their response was correct. 
Although this was significantly lower than the 93% confidence level reported by the participants who 
gave the correct response, this still demonstrates the attractiveness of the heuristic response, and that 
generating this response is accompanied by a high level of confidence. Thus, to be able to produce a 
correct response, participants have to display an outstanding ability to effectively monitor and correct 
their impulsive response tendencies (cf., Frederick, 2005). As a result, it is only a small minority of 
participants who tend to produce correct responses to the tasks.  
Frederick (2005, p.26) described the CRT as a “simple measure of one type of cognitive 
ability”, and reported reliable relationships between cognitive reflection and measures of intelligence, 
as well as decision-making skills. Specifically, cognitive reflection was found to be negatively related 
to temporal discounting (i.e., the tendency to prefer smaller, immediately available rewards, as 
compared to larger rewards which will be available later), and positively related to choosing gambles 
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with higher expected values (Frederick, 2005). Further studies showed that the CRT was also related to 
some typical heuristics and biases tasks, as well as to logical reasoning ability (e.g., Liberali, Reyna, 
Furlan et al., 2012; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011, 2014). Furthermore, although the CRT correlates 
with measures of intelligence and numeracy (e.g., Frederick, 2005) it was found to explain additional 
variance in reasoning and decision-making tasks when it was administered together with measures of 
intelligence and numeracy (Liberali et al., 2012; Toplak et al., 2011). In line with these findings, 
Campitelli and Gerrans (2013) demonstrated by means of mathematical modelling that the CRT was 
not just a measure of numeracy. Other studies showed an association between the CRT and 
metacognitive skills (Mata, Ferreira & Sherman, 2013), and people’s motivation to fully understand 
causal mechanisms (Fernbach, Sloman, Louis & Shube, 2013), and a negative association between the 
CRT and superstitious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012). 
Overall, these results demonstrate that the CRT is a very powerful predictor of a person’s ability to 
make unbiased judgments and rational decisions in a wide variety of contexts. 
The aim of the present studies 
Despite the widespread use of the CRT, its psychometric properties have not been extensively 
investigated. Most importantly, there are no available data regarding the dimensionality of the scale. In 
fact, besides its validity, the only property of the scale which has been investigated was its reliability. 
In his original publication, Frederick (2005) did not report the reliability of the scale, and most 
researchers who used the scale followed the same practice. A few exceptions include Liberali et al. 
(2012), who reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .74 in Study 1 and .64 in Study 2, Weller, Dieckmann, 
Tusler et al. (2012) and Campitelli and Gerrans (2013) who reported respectively .60 and .66, and 
Morsanyi, Busdraghi and Primi (2014), who reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .57 in Experiment 1, and 
.68 in Experiment 2. Thus, one aim of the present investigation was to address these issues. 
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Another aim was to develop some new items, and a longer version of the scale.  The most 
important reason for developing a longer version of the scale is related to the difficulty of the original 
items. Indeed, in his original publication, Frederick (2005) reported that in some university student 
samples, more than 50% of the respondents scored 0 on the test. Thus, the test might not be suitable for 
lower ability or less educated participants. This obviously limits the generalizability of the findings and 
makes the scale unsuitable for populations with lower levels of cognitive reflection (e.g., 
developmental samples). Additionally, even in the case of highly educated adults, using more items can 
make it possible to discriminate more precisely between respondents with different levels of cognitive 
reflection. Indeed, by adding some new items to the scale, it is more likely that a normal distribution of 
scores can be obtained, instead of the typical finding of a highly skewed distribution (i.e., a high 
proportion of participants scoring zero on the scale). Finally, given the huge popularity of the scale, 
some participants might already be familiar with the original items,  which obviously weakens the 
suitability of the original scale for measuring cognitive reflection. Given that the new items are 
unknown, it is obviously not possible for participants to retrieve the correct responses from memory. 
Very recently, Toplak et al. (2014) also developed a longer version of the scale. This scale 
offers the advantage of presenting four new items, and the new scale (including the original and the 
new items) had good reliability (a Cronbach’s alpha of .74). The new items also showed similar 
relationships with various measures of rational thinking, reasoning and thinking dispositions as the 
original scale. Nevertheless, this scale has its own limitations. Most importantly, one of the four new 
items was not open-ended, but participants had to choose from three response options, which made it 
possible to generate a correct response by chance. Moreover, for one item (the “barrel problem”) only 
54% of the participants in Toplak et al.’s sample generated either the heuristic or the correct response. 
Indeed, the heuristic response was only given by 31% of responders, whereas 46% of responders 
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generated a different incorrect response
1
. This was in sharp contract with the findings regarding the 
original items where over 80% of the responders generated either the typical heuristic or the correct 
response for each item, and 60% or more respondents generated the heuristic response. Additionally, 
the dimensionality of the scale was not analyzed, it is unclear how the most suitable items to be 
included in the scale were identified (for example, it is not stated whether other items were considered 
in the study, but then discarded), and the results were only based on a single sample of university 
students (n=160). 
The Item Response Theory (IRT) model 
We addressed the above issues regarding the existing versions of the CRT by testing the 
psychometric properties of the original scale and developing a new version, the Cognitive Reflection 
Test – Long, CRT-Long) through applying Item Response Theory (IRT). We chose to employ IRT 
analyses, as the application of IRT have potential benefits in testing and improving the accuracy of 
assessment instruments. More specifically, IRT is a model that provides a linkage between item 
responses and the latent characteristic assessed by a scale. IRT assumes that each examinee responding 
to a test item possesses some amount of the underlying ability. At each ability level, there will be a 
certain probability P( ) that an examinee will give a correct response to the item. If one plotted P() as 
a function of ability, the result would be a smooth S-shaped curve (see Figure 1). This S-shaped curve, 
known as the Item Characteristic Curve (ICC), describes the probability of a correct response to an 
item as a function of the possessed ability. This probability will be small for examinees of low ability 
and large for examinees of high ability. The probability of a correct response is near zero at the lowest 
levels of ability. It continues to increase up to the highest levels of ability, where the probability of 
                                                          
1 During our scale construction process (see the description in the method section of Study 2) we also considered the “barrel problem”, 
but discarded it for similar reasons (i.e., most participants who gave an incorrect response did not generate the supposed heuristic 
response). 
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producing a correct response approaches 1. Each item in a test will have its own item characteristic 
curve depending on its specific properties.  
 
____ 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
____ 
 
Although a number of different IRT models exist, the most commonly employed one is the two- 
parameter logistic model (2PL) which assumes a single underlying ability and two item parameters: the 
difficulty parameter (b) and the discrimination parameter (a). Under IRT, the difficulty of an item 
describes where the item functions along the trait, and it can be interpreted as a location index with 
regard to the trait being measured. For example, a less difficult item functions among the low-trait 
respondents and a more difficult item functions among the high-trait respondents. The second item 
property is discrimination, which describes how well an item can differentiate between examinees with 
different levels of ability. The slope corresponds to item discrimination. It describes how rapidly the 
probabilities change in correspondence with changes in ability levels. This property is essentially 
reflected by the steepness of the item characteristic curve. The steeper the curve, the better the item can 
discriminate between levels of ability. The flatter the curve, the less the item is able to discriminate.  
Additionally, IRT makes it possible to assess the measurement precision of the test through the 
Test Information Function (TIF) which, instead of providing a single value (e.g., coefficient alpha) for 
reliability, evaluates the precision of the test at different levels of the measured construct (see 
Embreston & Reise, 2000; Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991). The information function is the 
expected value of the inverse of the error variances for each estimated value of the underlying construct 
[I(θ) ≈ 1/SE2(θ)]. The associated reliability is 1 minus the inverse of the information the test provides [r 
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= 1- (1/I)]. This means that the more information the test provides at a particular ability level, the 
smaller the error associated with ability estimation is, and the higher the test’s reliability. In terms of 
graphical presentation, the Test Information curve shows how well the construct is measured at 
different levels of the underlying construct continuum (e.g., a peak means that the scale is reliable in a 
narrow region of the latent distribution).  
Summary 
In sum, in the present work  we analyzed the properties of the original CRT items defining their 
precision and difficulty level using IRT (Study 1). In Study 2 we developed a new scale (CRT-L), 
which could be used as an extended version of the original one in order the overcome its limitations, in 
particular, that the original items might be familiar to respondents, and that they are only appropriate 
for highly educated adult samples. We investigated the validity of both the original CRT, and the CRT-
L, by measuring their correlations with intelligence, decision-making and reasoning skills, thinking 
dispositions, and measures of numeracy. We aimed at demonstrating that the new items and the CRT-L 
would show similar correlations with all of these measures as the original CRT. Finally, to test the 
suitability of the scale to be used with younger and less educated respondents, we investigated the 
performance of secondary school students on the CRT-L(Study 3). This study also presents a 
comparison between adolescents and young adults with regard to their tendency to produce heuristic 
and correct responses to the CRT items. 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we used IRT analyses to test the psychometric properties of the original CRT. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 438 university students (Mean age = 20.4 years; SD = 4.1; 75% female; 
26% Italian and 74% British) attending the first or second year of university at the School of 
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Psychology and the School of Medicine in Florence (Italy) and Belfast (United Kingdom). All students 
participated on a voluntary basis. 
Materials and procedure  
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is composed of three items
2
 (Frederick, 2005). The items 
are open-ended and there is no time limit to solve them. The responses were classified as correct, 
heuristic (i.e., the typical intuitive response that quickly comes to mind) or atypical (i.e., neither 
heuristic, nor correct). A single composite score was computed based on the sum of correct responses. 
Each participant individually completed the CRT in a self-administered format. Students were 
instructed to take as much time as they needed to complete the tasks. The average administration time 
was about 3 minutes. Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .65. 
Results 
Item descriptives were calculated and, as expected, the vast majority of participants generated 
either the correct or the heuristic response for each item (see Table 1).  
Then, using the correct responses, the factorial structure of the original CRT was tested 
evaluating the presence of local dependence (LD) that is a term used to describe excess covaration 
among item responses that is not accounted for by a unidimensional IRT model. To investigate LD, the 
2 LD statistic (Chen & Thissen, 1997) was used. A value of 10 or greater is considered noteworthy. 
Results showed that a single factor model adequately represented the structure of the CRT given that 
none of the LD statistics were greater than .7. The factor loadings were all significant (p < .001) and 
high in value
3
 (see Table 1).  
                                                          
2
 The Italian version of the CRT was obtained using a forward-translation method: two non-professional translators worked 
independently, and then they compared their translations with the purpose of assessing equivalence, taking into account the differences in 
cultural context. Subsequently, a group of five people read this first version, revised it, and eventually obtained a final form which can be 
considered consistent with the original one . Please email the Authors for a copy of the Italian version of the scale. 
 
3 The same analyses were conducted separately on the Italian and English samples to check for equivalence. The results attested that the 
Italian and English versions of the scale shared the same one-factor structure, and similar patterns of factor loadings. This made it possible 
to merge the data across the British and Italian samples to perform IRT analyses. 
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____ 
Insert Table 1 around here 
____ 
 
Having verified the assumption that a single continuous construct accounted for the covariation 
between item responses, unidimensional IRT analyses were performed. The two-parameter logistic 
model (2PL) was tested in order to estimate the item difficulty and discrimination parameters. The 
parameters were estimated by employing the marginal maximum likelihood (MML) estimation method 
with the EM algorithm (Bock & Aitkin, 1981) implemented in IRTPRO software (Cai, Thissen, & du 
Toit, 2011). In order to test the adequacy of the model, the fit of each item under the 2PL model was 
tested computing the S-χ2 statistics. Each item had a non-significant S-χ2 value, indicating that all 
items fit under the 2PL model. Concerning the difficulty parameters (b), the results showed that the 
parameters ranged from .08  .07 to .70  .12 logit across the continuum of the latent trait. The logit is 
the logarithm of the odd, that is, the ratio between the probability of producing a correct response and 
the probability of responding incorrectly.  Given that the difficulty parameter b has a mean of zero and 
SD of 1.0, all the CRT items had an above-medium level of difficulty with item 3 being easier than the 
other items. With regard to the discrimination parameters (a), following Baker’s (2001) criteria, all 
three items showed large discrimination levels (a values over 1.34). Figure 2 shows the item 
characteristics curves used in IRT. All items were located in the positive range of the trait, indicating 
the regions where they function better. Discrimination is represented by the steepness of the curve. All 
items showed a high slope, indicating their ability to distinguish between respondents with different 
levels of the trait around their location. 
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____ 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
____ 
Finally, in order to identify the level of ability that is accurately assessed by the scale, the Test 
Information Function (TIF) was analyzed. The peak of the TIF is where measurement precision is the 
greatest. The TIF estimated under the 2PL model showed that the original CRT scale was sufficiently 
informative for the middle level of the trait within the range of trait from -0.4 to 0.4 standard deviations 
around the mean (fixed by default to 0; see Figure 3). Specifically, the overall distribution of 
information reveals that the CRT provides more information around the mean level of the trait (I = 
6.10, r = .84) and that information is relatively consistent between trait levels -.4 (I = 3.61, r = .72) and 
.4 (I = 5.02, r = .80), but information declines sharply below 3 (corresponding to a reliability level < 
.70) in the rest of the trait range. Accordingly, the three items of the CRT seem incapable of 
differentiating low from lower medium as well as higher medium from high levels of the latent trait. 
____ 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
____ 
Discussion 
Despite the widespread use of the CRT scale, its dimensionality has never been tested. The 
present study established the unidimensionality of the CRT , which is a desirable characteristic, as it 
makes it suitable to be used as a population screen of the cognitive reflection trait. 
Applying IRT analyses for the first time to measure the psychometric properties of the CRT, we 
also demonstrated that the original CRT items had high discriminative power( i.e. they were able to 
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distinguish between respondents with different levels of the cognitive reflection trait), and they had a 
medium level of difficulty.  
Study 2 
This study was aimed at developing a longer versionof the CRT scale, with the addition of new 
items which have similar properties to the original ones, but possess different difficulty parameters. In 
this way, it would be possible to obtain a scale which could also be used to measure the cognitive 
reflection ability trait in lower ability or less educated participants. Similarly to Experiment 1, we 
conducted IRT analyses to estimate item parameters.  Additionally, the validity of the new items, and 
of the CRT-Long (CRT-L) were studied. In particular, we aimed at demonstrating that the CRT-L 
showed similar correlations with various measures of intelligence, numeracy, decision-making skills, 
reasoning ability, and thinking dispositions as the original CRT, and confirming that the CRT-L is a 
better predictor of decision making performance than numeracy and fluid intelligence. This is 
important, as previous research showed that the CRT was more than just a test of numeracy and 
intelligence (see Liberali et al., 2012; Toplak et al., 2011). Moreover, we measured gender differences, 
and in line with the original study by Frederick (2005), we expected to find that males would perform 
better on the CRT-L. We also repeated the IRT analyses of the original CRT items in order to 
demonstrate the robustness of the results across different samples. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 988 students (Mean age = 20.2 years; SD = 1.8; 63% female; 76% Italian 
and 24% British) attending the senior year of high school (40%) or undergraduate university 
courses(60%) at the School of Psychology and the School of Medicine in Florence (Italy) and Belfast 
(United Kingdom). All students participated on a voluntary basis, and the university students received 
ungraded course credit for their participation. 
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Materials  
The Cognitive Reflection Test - Long (CRT-L)
4
 was composed of the three original items 
(Frederick, 2005) and three new items (see Appendix A).  
The development of the new items followed three steps in which some items were eliminated 
and others modified (see Appendix B for the list of items considered). In the first step, we piloted 6 
new items on 52 Italian university students. This version included 5 new items developed by Shane 
Frederick (personal communication, July 2012), and an additional item based on Van Dooren, De 
Bock, Hessels, Janssens and Verschaffel (2005). The initial results showed that from the 6 new items, 
only a single item (item 5 in Appendix B, which is also included in Toplak et al.’s long version of the 
CRT) displayed similar properties to the original CRT items, in that most participants either produced 
the correct response or a typical incorrect response.  
Based on these initial findings, we kept one item unchanged (item 5 in Appendix B), we 
modified the numbers in three items (items 1, 4 and 6), discarded two items, and generated 3 new items 
(items 7-9) where we tried to reproduce the structure of the original CRT items, but we used different 
content and numbers. The selection and modification of the items was performed with the aim of 
identifying items with similar, but also with lower and higher levels of difficulty than the three original 
ones. We administered the original and the new items to a sample of 58 Italian university students. The 
results showed that after the modifications, the four new items included in our first version of the scale, 
and one item (item 9) that we added later displayed the desired characteristics (i.e., that most 
participants either produced the heuristic or the correct response). In sum, this version of the scale 
included five new items: three items developed by Frederick, from these two were modified (i.e., the 
numbers included in them were changed), a modified version of Van Dooren et al.’s (2005) problem, 
and an additional item developed by us. This version was administered to a sample of 158 Italian 
                                                          
4 The Italian version of the CRT-L was obtained using a forward-translation method, using the same procedure as for the original CRT 
scale. 
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students and applying IRT two other items were discarded. One item (item 6) was discarded because it 
had a lower level of discrimination than the other items, and another one (item 1) had a bad fit under 
the 2PL model once item 6 was removed. In sum, the final version of the CRT-L was composed of six 
items: three original items (Frederick, 2005) and three new items (see Appendix A for the final version 
of the scale). A single composite score was computed based on the sum of correct responses. 
Coefficient alpha for the current sample was .76.  
Measure of intelligence 
Set I of the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM-Set I; Raven, 1962) is a measure of fluid 
intelligence, and it was used as a short form of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM, 
Raven, 1941). Set I of the APM is composed of 12 items that increase in their level of difficulty, and 
cover the full range of difficulty of the SPM (Raven, 1962). These items consist of a series of 
perceptual analytic reasoning problems, each presented in the form of a matrix. In each case, the lower 
right corner of the matrix is missing and the participant’s task is to determine which of eight possible 
options fits into the missing space such that the row and column transformations are satisfied. Using 
IRT analysis procedures, the short form of the SPM was found to have high reliability and validity 
(Chiesi, Ciancaleoni, Galli, & Primi, 2012). 
Measures of mathematical and probabilistic reasoning 
The Probabilistic Reasoning Questionnaire (PRQ, Primi, Morsanyi & Chiesi, 2014) was 
designed to measure proportional reasoning and basic probabilistic reasoning skills. The scale consists 
of 16 multiple-choice probabilistic reasoning questions. The items include questions about simple, 
conditional, and conjunct probabilities, and the numerical data are presented in frequencies or 
percentages. A single composite score was computed based on the sum of correct responses. 
Coefficient alpha for the current sample was .68. 
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The Numeracy Scale (NS, Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001) was composed of 11 items that assess 
basic probability and mathematical concepts including simple mathematical operations on risk 
magnitudes using percentages and proportions. A single composite score was computed based on the 
sum of correct responses. Coefficient alpha for the current sample was .59. 
The Math Fluency subtest of the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement (MF, Woodcock, 
McGrew, & Mather, 2001) was used as a measure of arithmetic skills. This test assesses the ability to 
solve simple addition, subtraction, and multiplication problems quickly. Participants were asked to 
work through a series of problems as quickly and accurately as possible within a three-minute time 
limit. The total number of items that were correctly solved was calculated to provide a math fluency 
score.  
The Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS, Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry & 
Smith, 2007) is a subjective measure (i.e., self-assessment) of quantitative ability which was developed 
with the aim of distinguishing between low- and high-numerate individuals, but in a less aversive and 
quicker way than it is possible with objective tests of numeracy. An example item is: “How good are 
you at working with fractions?” The items have to be rated on a 6-point Likert scale, which are labelled 
differently, depending on the question asked (e.g., ranging from 1=not good at all to 6=extremely 
good; or 1=never to 6=very often). A single composite score was computed based on participants’ 
ratings of each item. Coefficient alpha for the current sample was .62. 
Measures of reasoning abilities 
In the Conditional Probability task (based on Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009) participants were 
presented with a visual display of 8 cards, and they were given the following information. “There are 8 
cards in a pack. All the questions concern these 8 cards.” Some of the cards presented to participants 
were black, and some were white, and some of them had a circle printed on them, others had a square 
printed on them. The participants were then asked 4 questions about the cards, which had the  
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following format: “How likely are the following statements to be TRUE/FALSE of a card drawn 
randomly from the pack? If the card is black then there’s a square printed on it.” Participants had to 
provide a response in the format of: “__ out of __” (i.e., participants had to fill the gaps with the 
relevant numbers). Two questions asked about the likelihood of the statement being true, and two 
questions asked about the likelihood of the statements being false. Performance on the task measures 
hypothetical thinking skills, and it was found to be related to participants’ general intelligence (Evans, 
Handley, Neilens & Over, 2007). In the present sample a single composite score was computed, based 
on the overall number of correct responses. Cronbach’s alpha for the task in the current sample was .82. 
The Conditional Reasoning Task consisted of 12 problems. Four problems were included which 
corresponded to each of the following inference forms: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent 
(DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC). All the problems had familiar, everyday content (e.g., 
“If the radio is turned on, then you will hear music. The radio is not turned on. Is it necessary that: You 
will not hear music?”) Participants had to respond by choosing either “yes” or “no, it’s not necessary”. 
The participants were provided with detailed instructions, and were asked to imagine that the first two 
statements were always true, before deciding if the conclusion necessarily followed. Before completing 
the task, the participants were also presented with a practice problem to familiarize them with the 
presentation format. A single composite score, based on the total number of correct responses was 
computed. Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample was .65. 
The Transitive Inference task included 12 problems (which were closely modelled on Morsanyi, 
Devine, Nobes & Szucs, 2013). Four of the problems had believable conclusions, four had unbelievable 
conclusions and the remaining four had belief-neutral conclusions. In addition to this, half of the 
problems were valid (i.e., the conclusion followed from the premises) and half were invalid. Valid 
problems followed one of the following structures: A>B and B>C, is A>C? or A>B and C>A, is C>B? 
Invalid problems followed one of these structures: A>B and B>C, is C>A? or A>B and C>A, is B>C? 
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In the case of belief-laden problems, half of the problems were conflict problems (i.e., where the 
believability and validity of the problem cued a different response), and half of them were non-conflict 
problems. Problems from the various categories were mixed together, and were presented in the same 
order to all participants. Detailed instructions accompanied the problems, asking participants to accept 
the first two statements to be true, even if they were not true in real life. Participants were then asked to 
determine if the third statement logically followed from the first two statements, or if it did not 
necessarily follow. The problems had the following format. “Imagine that the following is always true: 
Sharks are more dangerous than cuttlefish.  Now imagine that this is also true: Cuttlefish are more 
dangerous than sea urchins. Is it necessary that: Sharks are more dangerous than sea urchins?” 
Participants had to respond by choosing either “yes” or “no, not necessarily”. A single composite score, 
based on the total number of correct responses was computed. Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample 
was .75. 
Measures of decision-making skills  
The Risk Seeking Behaviour questionnaire was composed of 8 items adapted from Frederick 
(2005). For each item participants indicated their preference between a certain, smaller gain and some 
probability of a larger gain. A composite score was created by summing the responses that indicated 
the preference to take a risk. A higher score indicated a higher preference to take a risk with the hope of 
obtaining a larger amount of money. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .57.  
The Intertemporal Behaviour questionnaire was composed of 5 items adapted from Frederick 
(2005). For each item, participants indicated their preference for a smaller amount of money now or a 
larger amount of money later. A composite score was created by summing the responses that indicated 
a preference to wait in order to obtain a larger amount of money. A higher score indicated a higher 
preference to wait for obtaining a larger amount of money. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .47. 
Although the reliability of this scale was lower than .5, which is considered to be a satisfactory level of 
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reliability (cf. Rust & Golombok, 1999), given that a very similar measure was used by Frederick 
(2005), we report the results regarding this measure as well.  
In the Framing Task participants chose between riskless and risky alternatives which had 
identical expected values, under both a gain-framing and a loss-framing condition. This task was an 
adaptation of Tversky and Kaheneman’s (1981) famous Asian disease problem. The order in which 
participants were presented with each framing condition was counterbalanced, and each participant was 
exposed to both versions. The following scale was used to indicate preference: 1.Strongly favor option 
A; 2.Favour option A; 3.Slightly favor option A; 4.Slightly favor option B; 5. Favor option B; 6 
Strongly favor option B. The problem was scored by subtracting the positive frame ratings from the 
corresponding negative frame ratings. A difference score of 0 indicated the absence of a framing effect 
and a positive score different form zero represented the presence of a framing effect. Respondents were 
classified by creating two groups: resistant to framing (difference score of 0) and susceptible to framing 
(a positive difference score different from zero). 
Measure of thinking dispositions  
The Superstitious Thinking Scale (STS, Kokis, MacPherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; 
Italian version: Chiesi, Donati, Papi, & Primi, 2010) was composed of eight Likert-type items using a 
5-point scale ranging from totally false to totally true, yielding a maximum score of 40. Higher scores 
represent high levels of superstitious thinking. Coefficient alpha for the current sample was .80. 
Procedure  
The participants individually completed the measures in a self-administered format in the 
classroom. Each task was briefly introduced, and instructions for completion were given. The answers 
were collected in a paper-and-pencil format. All participants completed the CRT-L, whereas the other 
measures were administered as follows. All Italian participants were administered the framing task, and 
one sample (N = 201) was administered the APM, the NS, and the risk seeking behaviour measure, and 
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another sample (N = 393) worked through the STS and the intertemporal behavior questionnaire. A 
British subsample (N = 234) was administered the PRQ, the SNS and the conditional probability tasks. 
Another British subsample (N = 59) was administered the math fluency test, the conditional reasoning 
test, and the transitive inference test. Administration time ranged from half an hour to an hour and a 
half.  
Results 
The item properties of the CRT scale 
Item descriptives were calculated and, in line with the results of Study 1 the vast majority of 
participants generated either the correct or the heuristic response for each item (see Table 2).  
Then, using the correct responses, we tested the unidimensionality of the scale, evaluating the 
presence of local dependence (LD). The results confirmed that a single factor model adequately 
represented the structure of the CRT since none of the LD statistics were greater than .7. Factor 
loadings were all significant (p < .001) and high in value
5
 (see Table 2).  
Having verified the assumption that a single continuous construct accounted for the covariation 
between item responses, unidimensional IRT analyses were performed. In order to test the adequacy of 
the model, the fit of each item under the 2PL model was tested computing the S-χ2 statistics. Each item 
had a non-significant S-χ2 value, indicating that all items fit under the 2PL model. Concerning the 
difficulty parameters (b), the results showed that the parameters ranged from -.12  .07 to .43  .07 
logit across the continuum of the latent trait.  
As in Study 1 item 3 was easier than the other two items which had above-medium levels of 
difficulty. Concerning the discrimination parameters (a), following Baker’s criteria (2001), all three 
items showed large discrimination levels (a values over 1.34; seeTable 2). As in Study 1 all items were 
located in the positive range of the trait, indicating the regions where they function better. 
                                                          
5 As in Study 1, we confirmed that the Italian and English versions of the scale shared the same one-factor structure, and similar 
patterns of factor loadings. 
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Discrimination is represented by the steepness of the curve. The steeper the curve, the better the item 
can discriminate. All items showed a high slope indicating their ability to distinguish between 
respondents with different levels of the cognitive reflection trait around their location.  
In sum, the comparison between Studies 1 and 2 confirmed the consistency of the properties of 
the CRT items across samples. the results showed that the items were able to distinguish between 
respondents with different levels of the cognitive reflection trait around their location which was above 
the mean. 
The item properties of the CRT-L  
As a preliminary step, item descriptives were calculated for the CRT-L. We confirmed that the 
participants mostly generated either the correct or the heuristic response for each item (see Table 3).  
Two new items (items 5 and 6) showed similar percentages of correct responses as the original 
items, whereas item 4 was easier than the other items. Additionally, whereas a high proportion (30%) 
of participants scored zero on the original scale, on the CRT-L only 9% of participants scored zero. 
____ 
Insert Table 2 around here 
____ 
Preliminarily, we tested the assumption of unidimensionality with the standardized local 
dependence LD
6
. None of the standardized 2 indices of LD approached the value of 10. Factor 
loadings were all significant (p < .001), ranging from .70 to .85 (see Table 2). Having verified the 
assumption that a single continuous construct accounted for the covariation between correct responses 
to each item, unidimensional IRT analyses were performed.  
                                                          
6 The Italian and English versions of the scale shared the same one-factor structure, and similar patterns of factor loadings. This made it 
possible to merge the data across the British and Italian samples to perform IRT analyses on the CRT-L. 
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In order to test the adequacy of the model, the fit of each item under the 2PL model was tested 
computing the S-χ2 statistics. Each item had a non-significant S- χ2 value (see Table 2), indicating that 
all items fit under the 2PL model. Concerning the difficulty parameters (b), the results showed that the 
parameters ranged from -.1.19  .09 to 0.42  .06 logit across the continuum of the latent trait (see 
Table 2). Concerning the discrimination parameters, all new items showed large discrimination levels 
(a values over 1.34 (see Table 2). Figure 4 shows the Item Characteristic Curves used in IRT to provide 
visual information of the item characteristics. Severity is represented by the location of the curve along 
the trait. Concerning the location of the new items, item 4 was located in the negative range, that is, it 
functions better in lower levels of the trait, item 5 was located in the positive range of the trait, that is, it 
is able to measure higher levels of the trait while item 6 had a medium level of difficulty. All items 
showed a high slope, indicating their ability to distinguish between respondents with different levels of 
the trait around their location. 
____ 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
____ 
Finally, in order to identify the level of ability that is accurately assessed by the scale, the TIF 
was analyzed. The test information function displayed in Figure 4 makes it possible to compare the 
varying measurement precision across the construct continuum for the CRT and the CRT-L. It can be 
seen that the CRT-L’s information curve has higher information values associated with a larger range 
of values of the construct as compared to the CRT. On the one hand, the overall distribution of 
information reveals that the CRT provides more information around the mean level of the trait (I = 
4.93, r = .80) and that information is relatively consistent between trait levels -0.4 (I = 4.29, r = .77) 
and 0.4 (I = 3.67, r = .73), but information declines sharply below 3 (corresponding to a reliability level 
< .70) in the rest of the trait range. Accordingly, the three items of the CRT seem incapable of 
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differentiating low from lower medium as well as higher medium from high levels of the latent trait. 
On the other hand, the overall distribution of information of the CTR-L reveals that it provides the most 
information around the mean level of the trait (I = 6.13, r = .84) but the information provided is 
relatively consistent across a larger range of the trait from -1.0 (I = 3.74, r = .73) to 1.0 (I = 3.47, r = 
.71), dropping below 3 under -1.2 and over 1.2. Accordingly, the six items of the CRT-L seem capable 
of differentiating from lower medium to higher medium levels of the latent trait and, as a result, they 
allow for a better assessment of individual differences in the cognitive reflection construct than the 
CRT. 
____ 
Insert Figure 5 around here 
____ 
 
The validity of the CRT-Long scale   
Descriptive statistics for each individual differences measure are reported in Table 4. 
Concerning the validity measures, Pearson product-moment correlations for the CRT and the CRT-L 
attested that the relationships which were investigated were significant and in the expected directions 
(see Table 3). Indeed, not only the CRT-L scale, but also the new items showed similar relationships 
with each construct which was investigated as the CRT.  
____ 
Insert Table 3 around here 
____ 
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Both CRT measures correlated positively with the APM
7
, which was in line with previous 
studies that reported a relationship between the CRT scores and measures of intelligence (Frederick, 
2005; Toplak et al., 2011). Concerning numeracy, we obtained a positive correlation with the CRT 
measures, and the values appeared to be similar to the values reported in previous studies employing 
the CRT (Cokely & Kelly, 2009; Liberali et al. 2011; Weller et al., 2013). In addition, we also found 
that the CRT scales showed similar correlations with some further measures of mathematical and 
probabilistic reasoning skills, including arithmetic skills (i.e., math fluency) and subjective numeracy. 
With regard to the decision-making measures, Frederick (2005) observed that the original CRT 
was positively related to decisions in risky choice tasks. Specifically, higher CRT scores were related 
to more risky choices than low CRT scores. Our findings are in line with previous results, confirming a 
positive correlation between risky choice and the CRT measures. We also found a positive correlation 
with intertemporal behavior (i.e., the tendency to prefer a larger reward that will be available later, over 
a smaller, immediately available reward), in line with Frederick (2005) and Toplak et al. (2011).  
Previous studies reported that the CRT was more than just a measure of intelligence or 
numeracy, as it predicted additional variance in reasoning and decision-making tasks (see Liberali et al, 
2012; Toplak et al., 2011; 2014). One sample of participants completed a test of numeracy and fluid 
intelligence, together with the CRT-L and the risk seeking behavior scale. Thus, in this sample we were 
able to test the hypothesis that the CRT-L score was a more powerful predictor of risk seeking behavior 
than fluid intelligence and numeracy. We conducted a simultaneous multiple regression analysis with 
risk seeking behavior total score as a dependent variable and CRT-L score, numeracy, and fluid 
intelligence as predictors. The results confirmed that, when entered simultaneously, the CRT-L score 
was a significant predictor (see Table 4) of risk seeking behavior whereas, numeracy and intelligence 
were not.  
                                                          
7 Regarding intelligence, the normality indices of the APM total score distribution revealed that departures from normality were 
acceptable (Skewness -.51 and Kurtosis =.34; Marcoulides & Hershberger,1997). 
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____ 
Insert Table 4 around here 
____ 
Another sample of participants completed the probabilistic reasoning questionnaire, together 
with the subjective numeracy scale and the math fluency scale. In this sample we were able to test the 
hypothesis that the CRT-L might be a better predictor of probabilistic reasoning skills than math 
fluency and subjective numeracy. When math fluency and subjective numeracy were entered into the 
regression equation together with the CRT-L, they did not significantly predict probabilistic reasoning 
performance, whereas the CRT-L was a significant predictor (see Table 5).       
____ 
Insert Table 5 around here 
____ 
Concerning thinking dispositions, we found, as expected, a negative correlation with 
superstitious thinking. 
With regard to our measures of reasoning ability (i.e., conditional probability reasoning, 
everyday conditional reasoning, and transitive inferences), again the relationships between the CRT 
scales and the reasoning tasks were similar across the two versions of the CRT, and cognitive reflection 
was positively related to reasoning ability (see also Campitelli & Gerrans; 2013; Toplak et al., 2011).  
Regarding the frame task, we first explored the effect of the order of exposure to the different 
frames. Finding no order effect, we collapsed the different order conditions in subsequent analyses. A t 
test for independent samples (resistant to framing vs. susceptible to framing) was conducted with CRT 
scores as the dependent variable. With regard to the original CRT scale, respondents who were resistant 
to framing had higher scores (M = 1.43; SD = 1.2) than respondents who were susceptible to framing 
effects (M = .82; SD = .99); t (488) = -5.90; p < .001; d = .55). Considering only the CRT-L new items 
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score the difference was also significant (t (487) =- 4.39; p < .001; d = .41) with respondents who were 
resistant to framing having higher scores (M = 1.64; SD = 1.01) than respondents who were susceptible 
to framing (M = 1.25; SD = .91). Finally, considering the CRT-L score the difference was again 
significant (t (474) = -5.58; p < .001; d = .53) with respondents who were resistant to framing having 
higher scores (M = 3.11; SD = 1.9) than respondents who were susceptible to framing (M = 2.13; SD = 
1.7). Differently from Toplak et al. (2014) but in line with Frederick (2005), our results attested the 
relationship between the CRT and susceptibility to the framing effect. 
Finally, concerning gender differences, in the original CRT, males (M = 1.63; SD = 1.1) scored 
significantly higher than females (M = 1.25; SD = 1.1; t (939) = 5.06; p < .001; d = .34). Considering 
only the CRT-L new items score the findings were consistent with the original CRT results, confirming 
a significant gender difference (t(922) = 3.67; p < .001; d = .20), with a better performance in males (M 
= 1.84; SD = .99 ) than in females (M = 1.64;  SD = .99). The same significant difference was found 
considering the CRT-L (t(908) = 4.86; p < .001; d = .32), with a better performance in males (M = 
3.54; SD = 1.9 ) than in females (M = 2.91; SD = 1.8). 
With regard to the origin of the gender differences, we tested the possibility that these were 
related to the numerical content of the problems. Indeed, gender differences have been found to affect 
mathematical problem solving, and the gender gap tends to be greater in highly select samples of young 
adults (e.g., Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon, 1990). Although the mathematical computations required to 
solve the CRT problems are simple, women might experience higher levels of anxiety, and might be 
less confident in their ability to solve these problems (e.g., Beilock, 2008).  
An Italian subsample completed the numeracy scale together with the CRT. Our preliminary 
analyses showed that female students scored significantly lower (M=7.05; SD=1.71) than males 
(M=7.70; SD=1.38; t(199)=2.46, p=.015, Cohen’s d=.35) on the numeracy scale. We run an ANCOVA 
with gender (male/female) as a within-subjects factor and numeracy as a covariate on the CRT-L 
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scores. Although the effect of gender was still significant (F(1,159)=4.81, p=.030, p
2
=.03), numeracy 
was also a significant covariate (F(1,159)=31.08, p<.001, p
2
 =.17).  
One of the British samples completed the subjective numeracy scale, and the PRQ together with 
the CRT. We first checked for gender differences on the PRQ and on the subjective numeracy scale. 
On the PRQ females (M=14.95; SD=1.31) and males (M=15.08; SD=1.22) performed equally well 
(p=.491). However, on the subjective numeracy scale females (M=36.92; SD=5.37) scored significantly 
lower than males (M=38.77; SD=5.61; t(212)=2.38, p=.018, Cohen’s d=.33). We run an ANCOVA 
with gender (male/female) as a within-subjects factor and subjective numeracy as a covariate on the 
CRT-L scores. Subjective numeracy was a significant covariate (F(1,203)=6.55, p=.011,  p
2
=.03), and 
the effect of gender was no longer significant (p=.102).  
Discussion 
In this study we confirmed the psychometric properties of the CRT items using a different 
sample, in order to demonstrate the robustness of the IRT results.  Indeed, just as in Study 1, the items 
had high discriminative power, and a medium level of difficulty.  
Regarding the CRT-Long scale the IRT analyses showed that the three new items had high 
discriminative power, and their location was more distributed along the ability trait in comparison with 
the original version with the additional advantage of including new items that participants are 
unfamiliar with. These analyses reconfirmed the suitability of the original items for measuring the 
cognitive reflection trait, and also demonstrated that the new 6-item version measures accurately a 
wider range of the cognitive reflection trait.  
Concerning the validity of the new scale, our study is unique in terms of the range of domains 
covered by our measures. We demonstrated that the CRT-Long showed similar correlations with 
various measures of numeracy, reasoning and decision making skills, intelligence and thinking 
dispositions as the original CRT. Indeed, the correlations that we obtained with these measures were 
27 
 
similar across the different versions of the scale, and also similar to the correlations reported in 
previous studies. We also included a set of novel measures of validity (i.e., probabilistic thinking, 
conditional probability reasoning, everyday conditional reasoning and transitive inferences), which 
were related to previously investigated constructs, but also furthered our understanding of the range of 
thinking skills that are assessed by the CRT. Previous studies (Liberali et al, 2012; Toplak et al., 2011; 
2014) demonstrated that the CRT predicted additional variance in reasoning and decision making tasks 
when it was administered together with measures of intelligence or numeracy. Although some of our 
measures were only completed by a subsample of our participants, we were able to run two 
simultaneous regression analyses where we compared the predictive power of the CRT-L with that of 
measures of numeracy and fluid intelligence. These analyses showed that the CRT-L was the strongest 
predictor of both probabilistic reasoning skills and risk seeking behavior, which further demonstrates 
the versatility of the CRT-L.  
Several previous studies reported gender differences in cognitive reflection (e.g., Campitelli & 
Gerrans, 2013; Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). We hypothesized that the reason for this might be 
that the CRT has a significant math component. Indeed, in one of our samples, controlling for 
numeracy significantly reduced the gender difference in the CRT, and in another sample controlling for 
subjective numeracy eliminated the gender difference. We will return to this issue in the general 
discussion.    
In summary, although the original CRT has appropriate psychometric properties, the new scale 
offers high precision across a wider range of the cognitive reflection ability trait, and reduces the 
proportion of participants who score zero on the scale. The new items also share the essential property 
of the original items that, although the problems are open-ended, the vast majority of participants 
produce either the correct or the typical heuristic response to problems. This is an important advantage 
of the present scale over the version proposed by Toplak et al. (2014).  Being able to also measure 
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precisely lower levels of cognitive reflection opens up the possibility of using the scale with 
populations other than highly educated adults (such as developmental samples, and older or less 
educated adults). The aim of Study 3 was to explore the suitability of the new scale to be used in 
developmental research. 
Study 3 
The results reported by Frederick (2005) demonstrated the difficulty of the original items. 
Indeed, in some university samples more than 50% of the participants scored 0 on the test. For this 
reason the original test might not be suitable for lower ability or less educated participants. In Study 2 
we demonstrated using IRT that the items of the CRT-Long displayed high discriminative power and 
their location was more distributed along the ability trait. For this reason we expected that the new 
scale would not only be more suitable to discriminate between participants with high levels of the 
cognitive reflection trait, but it would also be more suitable to measure cognitive reflection in 
participants with lower levels of the trait, such as adolescents. Indeed, given that even in some adult 
populations the majority of participants score zero on the original scale, floor effects in developmental 
populations seem almost inevitable.  
Making the scale more suitable for younger participants also means that it is possible to 
investigate developmental patterns in heuristic and correct responding. Thus, an important aim of this 
study was to compare the performance of adolescent and adult participants on the scale. Although the 
development of cognitive reflection has not been investigated before, there are good reasons to expect 
that adolescents would perform more poorly on the CRT and CRT-L than adults (i.e., they would 
produce fewer correct responses). Although very few studies (e.g., Chiesi et al., 2011; Klaczynski, 
2001a; Morsanyi & Handley, 2013) compared the performance of adolescents and adults on tasks 
which elicit a conflict between heuristic and normative response tendencies, these studies reported a 
general increase in normatively correct responses, whereas heuristic responding either decreased or 
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remained stable across development. Studies which investigated age-related changes during 
adolescence (e.g., Klaczysnki, 2001a,b; Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004) also reported similar changes 
between early and middle or late adolescence.  
In terms of establishing developmental patterns in heuristic and normative responding, two 
important properties of the CRT items deserve special attention. One of these is that whereas the 
normative standards used to evaluate some typical heuristics and biases tasks have been famously 
questioned (see e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996; Hertwig, Benz & Krauss, 2008), in the case of the CRT items 
the normative standards used are indisputable (i.e., the typical heuristic responses are clearly incorrect). 
Another very important characteristic of these items is that although the heuristic and correct responses 
are mutually exclusive, given that the problems are open-ended, heuristic and normative responses are 
not explicitly pitted against each other. This makes it possible to investigate heuristic and normative 
responding relatively independently (i.e., the ability to resist heuristic response tendencies does not 
necessarily imply that a participant will produce a correct response). 
In summary, the aim of our final study was to investigate the development of cognitive 
reflection for the first time, including an investigation of the tendencies to produce both heuristic and 
correct responses.       
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 70 British adolescents (29 females, between the ages of 11 years 7 months and 
14 years 4 months; mean age=13 years) recruited from a secondary school in a small town in Northern 
Ireland, and 287 young adults (199 females, between the ages of 18 and 25 years; mean age=19 years 2 
months) recruited from undergraduate courses at Queen’s University Belfast. None of the adult 
participants were involved in Study 2. 
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  Materials and procedure 
The participants individually completed the CRT-Long in a self-administered format in the 
classroom. The task was briefly introduced, and instructions for completion were given. The answers 
were collected in a paper-and-pencil format. Students could take as long as they needed to solve the 
problems. The average completion time was about 5 minutes. Cronbach’s alpha for the CRT-Long was 
.79 in the adolescent and .68 in the adult sample.  
Results 
First we present the distribution of correct and heuristic scores on the CRT-L for the early 
adolescents and young adults (see Figure 6). As it is apparent, the correct scores of the adult 
participants showed a close-to-normal distribution, and only 2% scored zero on the scale, which is a 
great improvement compared to the original scale where 33% of the adult participants scored zero. In 
the case of the adolescent sample, 49% scored zero on the scale, as opposed to 67% scoring zero on the 
original items.  
With regard to heuristic responses, in the adolescent sample nobody had a score of zero, and 14% 
of the sample scored 6 (i.e., they gave a heuristic response to every item). In the adult sample 16% 
scored zero, and 0.3% scored 6. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale using the heuristic scores was .61 for 
adolescents and .66 for young adults. Given these results, it could be advantageous to use the heuristic 
scores instead of the correct scores in the case of participants with lower levels of cognitive reflection.   
____ 
Insert Figure 6 around here 
____ 
Next we investigated the developmental changes in both heuristic and correct responding (see 
Table 5). In the case of each item the large majority (78% or more) of both adolescents and adults 
produced either the correct or the heuristic response. Chi-square tests indicated that young adults were 
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significantly more likely to respond correctly on each item (X
2
>11, p<.001) with the exception of item 
2 (p=.56). We also compared the proportion of heuristic responses across groups using chi-square tests. 
In general, adolescents were more likely to produce heuristic responses than adults. For each item, the 
chi-squared values were above 22 (p<.001), with the exception of items 2 and 5. For item 5 the chi-
squared test still indicated that the younger participants gave more heuristic responses than the older 
participants (X
2
 (1, N = 354) = 3.70, p=.054). In the case of item 2 there was no developmental change 
in the proportion of heuristic responses (p=.96). In sum, the developmental comparisons showed that in 
general correct responding increased with age, whereas heuristic responding decreased. The only 
exception was item 2 where the proportion of heuristic and correct responses remained stable with 
development.   
____ 
Insert Table 6 around here 
____ 
We also conducted a 2x2 ANOVA on the number of correct responses with item type (original 
items/new items) as a within-subjects and age group (adolescents/young adults) as a between-subjects 
factor. The aim of this analysis was to investigate how well the original and the new items 
discriminated between the two age groups. This analysis is also relevant for judging the suitability of 
the original and the new items in discriminating between participants with lower and higher levels of 
the cognitive reflection trait. The ANOVA showed a main effect of item type (F(1,336)=38.19, p<.001, 
p
2
=.10), a main effect of age group (F(1,336)=420.71, p<.001, p
2
=.56), and an item type by age 
group interaction (F(1,336)=20.00, p<.001, p
2
=.06). These results indicated that the new items 
(M=1.76 SD=.97) were easier than the original ones (M=1.17 SD=1.17), young adults (M=3.34 SD1.69) 
performed better than adolescents (M=1.34 SD=1.73), and the new items discriminated better between 
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the two age groups (the group difference on these items was 1.30; Cohen’s d=1.53) than the original 
items (the group difference on these items was .69; Cohen’s d=.64). 
Discussion 
In Study 3 the CRT–L was administered to a sample of adolescents, as well as to a new sample 
of young adults. The results showed that the CRT-L was a reliable measure of cognitive reflection in 
both populations. This was the case for both the heuristic and the correct responses. Additionally, a 
large majority of participants in both age groups (i.e., 78% or more) produced either the correct or the 
heuristic response for each item.  
By adding the new items, we created a scale where the distribution of scores in the case of 
young adults was close to normal, and only a very small proportion (i.e., 2%) of adult participants 
scored zero on the test. This is a very important improvement as compared to the original scale, where 
33% of our sample scored zero, making it impossible to precisely discriminate between respondents 
with low levels of the cognitive reflection trait. That is, in a population with low levels of the cognitive 
reflection trait, the predictive value of the original CRT would be diminished.  
With regard to early adolescents, although a large proportion (i.e., 49%) of this population 
scored zero on the CRT-L, the distribution of heuristic scores was close to normal. Additionally, the 
scale had good reliability when heuristic scores were used, which raises the possibility that heuristic 
responding on the scale could be a better indicator of (a lack of) cognitive reflection in populations 
with lower levels of the cognitive reflection trait than correct scores.   
We also explored developmental changes in cognitive reflection by comparing correct and 
heuristic responding across the two age groups. As expected, participants in the younger group 
produced more heuristic, and fewer correct responses. This was the case for all items, apart from item 2 
(an item from the original scale), where we found no developmental difference in either heuristic or 
correct responding. An additional analysis also confirmed that the new items discriminated better 
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between the two age groups than the old items. This also implies that, when the scale is administered to 
adult participants, adding the new items can help to discriminate more precisely between respondents 
with lower to medium levels of the cognitive reflection trait.    
Although the present results are in line with earlier studies which investigated developmental 
changes in heuristic reasoning between adolescence and adulthood (e.g., Chiesi et al., 2011; 
Klaczynski, 2001a; Morsanyi & Handley, 2013), it should be noted that the groups not only differed in 
their age. Indeed, it is very likely that university students had higher levels of numeracy, and they 
obviously represent a population with above-average levels of intelligence and motivation, which could 
also explain the differences in cognitive reflection between the two age groups. Nevertheless, 
regardless of whether these differences reflect developmental changes or other differences between the 
two samples, the present results clearly demonstrate the suitability of the CRT-Long to be used with 
populations with relatively low levels of cognitive reflection. 
General discussion 
Since its publication in 2005, Frederick’s paper on the CRT has been cited over 700 times. 
Indeed, the CRT is an extremely popular measure, as it only takes a few minutes to administer, and, at 
the same time, it is one of the best predictors of rational thinking and decision-making skills. 
Nevertheless, despite the widespread use of the CRT, its psychometric properties have not been 
extensively investigated. In his original publication, Frederick (2005) did not report the reliability of 
the scale, and, with a few exceptions (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2013; Liberali et al., 2012; Morsanyi et 
al., 2014; Weller et al., 2012) most researchers who used the scale followed the same practice.  
In the present studies, for the first time we aimed at investigating the psychometric properties of 
the CRT by employing Item Response Theory (IRT) in which characteristics of items in a test (i.e., 
item parameters) and the characteristic of individuals (i.e., a latent trait) are related to the probability of 
a positive response (i.e., a trait-consistent endorsement of an item). Applying IRT, we measured the 
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CRT items’ psychometric properties. Preliminarily, we tested the unidimensionality of the original 
CRT, which was never tested before. This is a desirable characteristic, as a single-factor structure 
facilitates the scale’s function as a population screen of the cognitive reflection trait. 
Our analyses demonstrated that the original CRT items had high discriminative power i.e., they 
were able to distinguish between respondents with different levels of the cognitive reflection trait 
around their location, which was above the mean. Given the difficulty of the original items, a large 
proportion of educated adults score zero on the scale. For this reason, we developed a longer version of 
the scale with the aim of measuring a wider range of the trait. The CRT-L also showed 
unidimensionality, and the properties of the new items (i.e., difficulty and discrimination) were 
consistent with our aims. With regard to difficulty, one of the new items was located around the mean, 
one below the mean, and one above the mean. Concerning discrimination, the parameter estimates 
indicated that the items of the CRT-L were able to distinguish well between different levels of the trait.  
Additionally, our validity results clearly showed that the CRT-L (similarly to the CRT) had a 
significant mathematics component (see also Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Libearli et al., 2011; Welsh 
et al., 2013) but it was also related to decision-making skills (Frederick, 2005), measures of rational 
thinking and reasoning ability (Toplak et al., 2011; 2014), and thinking dispositions (e.g., Fernbach et 
al., 2013; Mata et al., 2013; Pennycook et al., 2012). Overall, these results confirmed that the CRT-L, 
just like the original CRT, is a reliable and powerful predictor of a person’s ability to make unbiased 
judgments and rational decisions in a wide variety of contexts.  
Given that the CRT is related to a wide range of measures (including measures of numeracy, 
intelligence, thinking dispositions, and reasoning and decision making skills), the question arises what 
cognitive reflection really is, and whether it exists as an independent construct. For example, would it 
be advantageous to develop a measure of cognitive reflection which shows weaker correlations with 
measures of numeracy or intelligence? Frederick (2005, p. 26) described the CRT as “a simple measure 
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of one type of cognitive ability”, as well as “the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response 
that first comes to mind” (Frederick, 2005, p. 35). Some other researchers described the CRT as an 
ability measure, whereas others consider it both as an ability and a disposition measure (see Campitelli 
& Gerrans, 2013 for a review). Although this question is theoretically important, the aim of the present 
studies was not to better understand the construct of cognitive reflection or to develop a version of the 
scale which is less strongly related to numeracy, intelligence or thinking dispositions. Indeed, we 
expect that in that case the CRT would lose some of its predictive power. Rather we aimed at 
developing a version which preserves the original properties of the CRT in terms of its relationships 
with other constructs, but it is also appropriate for participants with lower levels of the trait. Thus, 
similarly to the original items, all new items included numerical content, and predominantly elicited 
either a correct response or a typical incorrect (i.e., heuristic) response.   
Similarly to previous studies (e.g., Albaity, Rahman & Shahidul, 2014; Campitelli & Gerrans, 
2013; Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014), we found a gender difference on the CRT, as well as on the 
CRT-L. Our analyses also suggested that the numerical content of the problems might be responsible 
for these gender differences. Although designing problems with no numerical content might eliminate 
the gender differences, without the numerical content it might be difficult to design problems where 
there are clear normative standards (i.e., where we can confidently say that the typical heuristic 
response is incorrect). Indeed, a core idea behind the concept of cognitive reflection is that the 
effortless, heuristic responses are incorrect, and correct responses can only be generated through 
effortful processing.  
Overall the results attested that the CRT-L scale is more adequate for younger and less educated 
samples than the original CRT. This is a very important improvement over the original CRT, as it 
makes it possible to investigate changes in cognitive reflection across the life span. A related potential 
direction of future research is to examine whether cognitive reflection shows similar relationships with 
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measures of decision making, reasoning, intelligence, thinking dispositions and numeracy in the case of 
adolescents and older adults as in the case of highly educated younger adults (the typical target 
population of cognitive reflection research). This could give further insight into developmental changes 
in thinking skills and dispositions.  
Finally, more items can also be advantageous in investigating the potential effects of 
experimental manipulations on cognitive reflection. Indeed, such studies could be very informative 
with regard to the optimal conditions for rational decision making and reasoning, as well as regarding 
circumstances which are the most likely to lead to incorrect heuristic responses. For example, Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley and Eyre (2007, Experiment 1) showed that students from an elite university were 
more likely to give correct responses to the CRT when the problems were presented in a hard-to-read 
font, whereas Morsanyi et al. (2014, Experiment 3) showed that working memory load reduced 
cognitive reflection. 
We acknowledge that the CRT-L might not include a complete range of difficulty, and that our 
results are limited by the number of items that were included in the initial item pool. In fact, 
examination of the item parameters would suggest that more items could be added in order to more 
finely differentiate among respondents, especially between those at the extreme ends of cognitive 
reflection ability. Future research using IRT analyses can help to create an adaptive test that may assess 
cognitive reflection across a wider range of the trait. Future work could also address further the 
question of gender differences in cognitive reflection, and whether it was possible to develop a scale to 
measure the tendency to give incorrect heuristic responses without the inclusion of numerical content. 
Nevertheless, the CRT-L offers a useful extension to the original scale, and it should inspire further 
research into cognitive reflection, including previously neglected topics, such as the issue of 
developmental changes, and the effect of experimental manipulations.  
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Table 1. Percentage of correct and heuristic responses, standardized factor loadings, fit statistics, 
and parameters for each item of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) based on Study 1. 
 
Item 
%  
C (H) 
   S-2(df) b (SE) a (SE) 
1 43 (56) .70 .05 (1)  .26 (.09) 1.70 (.32) 
2 34 (57) .66 .04 (1)  .70 (.12) 1.48 (.26) 
3 47 (46) .90 .03 (1)  .08 (.07) 3.05 (.75) 
Note. % represents the percentage of correct (C) and heuristic (H) responses. Standardized factor loadings  are all 
significant at p = .001. The parameters were computed under the 2PL model (a = discrimination, b = difficulty).  
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Table 2. Percentages of correct and heuristic responses, standardized factor loadings, fit statistics, and 
parameters for each item of the CRT and CRT-L based on Study 2. 
Item CRT 
%  
C (H) 
   S-2(df)   b (SE) a (SE) 
1 39 (49) .65 .65 (1)   .43 (.07) 1.45 (.16) 
2 44 (48) .74 .61 (1)   .21 (.06) 1.90 (.24) 
3 54 (36) .89 .70 (1)  -.12 (.07) 3.26 (.68) 
Item CRT-L 
%  
C (H) 
   S-2(df)   b (SE) a (SE) 
1 39 (49) .70 6.30 (4)   .39 (.06) 1.69 (.16) 
2 44 (48) .74 7.34 (4)   .20 (.05) 1.89 (.18) 
3 54 (36) .85 13.07 (4)  -.15 (.05) 2.73 (.29) 
4 81 (15) .77  9.42 (4)    -1.19 (.09)   2.03 (.23) 
5 37 (36) .74  7.24 (4)     .42 (.06)  1.86 (.18) 
6 49 (37) .73  1.19 (4)     .01 (.05)  1.79 (.17) 
Note. % represents the percentage of correct (C) and heuristic (H) responses. Standardized factor loadings  are all 
significant at p = .001. Parameters were computed under the 2PL model (a = discrimination, b = severity). Due to the large 
sample size (N = 988),  was fixed at .01.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the individual differences measures, and correlations between the 
CRT, the CRT-L new items, the CRT-L and all the other variables in the study.  
 M (SD) 
Range 
CRT CRT-Long new 
items 
CRT-Long 
APM 8.43 (1.99) 
1-12 
.32*** 
(N=201) 
.31*** 
(N=201) 
.39*** 
(N=201) 
PRQ 14.96 (1.44) 
5-16 
.31*** 
(N=234) 
.29*** 
(N=234) 
.33*** 
(N=234) 
NS 9.16 (1.72) 
3-11 
.41*** 
(N=201) 
.36*** 
(N=201) 
.44*** 
(N=201) 
Math Fluency 109.95 (21.95) 
67-158 
.28* 
(N=59) 
.42** 
(N=59) 
.42** 
(N=59) 
SNS 37.70 (5.51) 
21-48 
.19** 
(N=234) 
.15* 
(N=234) 
.19** 
(N=234) 
Conditional Probability 3.66 (.67) 
1-4 
.22** 
(N=226) 
.16** 
(N=226) 
.22** 
(N=226) 
Conditional Reasoning 6.12 (2.27) 
3-12 
.35** 
(N=59) 
.29** 
(N=59) 
.38* 
(N=59) 
Transitive Inferences 5.41 (1.05) 
1-6 
.24 
(N=59) 
.30* 
(N=59) 
.32* 
(N=59) 
Risk Seeking Behaviour 2.74 (1.66) 
0-8 
.18* 
(N=199) 
.25** 
(N=199) 
.26** 
(N=199) 
Intertemporal Behaviour 2.20 (1.29) 
0-5 
.13** 
(N=199) 
.20** 
(N=199) 
.16** 
(N=199) 
STS 17.55 (6.46) 
8-36 
-.24*** 
(N= 393) 
-.23*** 
(N=393) 
-.27*** 
(N=393) 
APM = Advanced Progressive Matrices, PRQ=  Probabilistic Reasoning Questionnaire, NS = Numeracy Scale,  
SNS = Subjective Numeracy Scale, STS = Superstitious Thinking Scale.
 
p=.067; * p<.05; **  p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 4. Multiple regression with risk seeking behavior total score as dependent variable and 
numeracy, fluid intelligence and CRT-L as independent variables. 
Predictors B β t p 
Numeracy -.11 -.09 -1.07 .29 
Fluid intelligence .03 .04 .42 .68 
CRT-L .28 .29 3.23 .002 
      F(3,158)=4.33, p=.006; R=.28; R
2
=.08 
  
47 
 
Table 5. Multiple regression with probabilistic reasoning score as dependent variable and math 
fluency, subjective numeracy and CRT-L scores as independent variables. 
Predictors B β t p 
Math fluency .02 .16 1.14 .26 
Subjective numeracy .04 .13 .96 .34 
CRT-L  .53 .30 2.10 .04 
      F(3,58)=5.23, p=.003; R=.47; R
2
=.22 
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Table 6. The proportion of correct and heuristic responses given to each item and the overall 
proportion of correct and heuristic responses on the CRT and CRT-L across the adolescent and adult 
samples. 
 Correct responses Heuristic responses 
 adolescents adults adolescents adults 
Item 1 17% 48% 80% 48% 
Item 2 27% 31% 62% 62% 
Item 3 17% 50% 76% 44% 
Item 4 40% 81% 57% 18% 
Item 5 17% 39% 61% 49% 
Item 6 16% 84% 66% 8% 
CRT 20% 43% 72% 51% 
CRT-Long 22% 56% 67% 38% 
 
 
 
  
49 
 
Figure captions 
Figure 1. Exemplar Theoretical Item Characteristic Curve for the Two-Parameter Logistic Item 
Response Theory Model (a = discrimination, b = difficulty). 
 
Figure 2. The ICCs of the original Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) items under the 2PL model in 
Study 1. The latent trait (Theta) is represented on the horizontal axis and the probability of correct 
responding is shown on the vertical axis.  
 
Figure 3. Test information function of the CRT under the 2PL model. Latent trait (Theta) is shown on 
the horizontal axis, and the amount of information and the standard error yielded by the test at any trait 
level are shown on the vertical axis. 
 
Figure 4. The ICCs of the Cognitive Reflection Test-Long (CRT-L) items under the 2PL model in 
Study 2. The latent trait (Theta) is represented on the horizontal axis and the probability of correct 
responding is shown on the vertical axis.  
 
Figure 5. Test information function of the CRT-L under the 2PL model. The latent trait (Theta) is 
shown on the horizontal axis, and the amount of information and the standard error yielded by the test 
at any trait level are shown on the vertical axis. 
 
Figure 6. Histograms presenting the distribution of correct and heuristic scores on the CRT-Long for 
the early adolescents and young adults. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost?  Correct answer= 5 cents; Heuristic answer= 10 cents 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets?  Correct answer= 5 minutes; Heuristic answer= 100 minutes 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
      Correct answer= 47 days; Heuristic answer= 24 days 
 
 
Additional items included in the CRT-Long 
 
4. If 3 elves can wrap 3 toys in 1 hour, how many elves are needed to wrap 6 toys in 2 hours? 
  Correct answer= 3 elves; Heuristic answer= 6 elves 
 
 
5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are there in 
the class? 
       Correct answer= 29 students; Heuristic answer= 30 students 
 
        6. In an athletics team tall members are three times as likely to win a medal than short members. This   
year the team has won 60 medals so far. How many of these have been won by short athletes? 
 Correct answer= 15 medals; Heuristic answer= 20 medals 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Additional items considered during the development of the CRT-L scale 
 
 Items considered during the scale construction process Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
1* If you flipped a fair coin 3 times, what is the probability that it would 
land "Heads" at least once? ______ percent 
   
2* A car and a bus are on a collision course, driving toward each other. 
The car is going 70 miles an hour. The bus is going 80 miles an hour. 
How far apart are they one minute before they collide?______ miles 
   
3* If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink 
one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink 
one barrel of water together? ______ days 
   
4* If three elves can wrap six toys in half an hour, how many elves are 
needed to wrap twenty toys in one hour?______ elves 
   
5* Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the 
class. How many students are in the class?______ students 
   
6
 
Ellen and Kim are running around a track. They run equally fast but 
Ellen started later. When Ellen has run 5 laps, Kim has run 15 laps. 
When Ellen has run 30 laps, how many has Kim run? _____laps                         
   
7 An ice cream vendor sells 2/3 of her stock of ice creams on sunny 
days, and 1/3 of her stock on cloudy days. Yesterday it was a sunny 
day, and she sold 300 ice creams. Today is a cloudy day. How many 
can she expect to sell? 
   
8 In a class there are 42 children. There are 12 more girls than boys. 
How many girls are there in the class? 
   
9 In an athletics team tall members are three times as likely to win a 
medal than short members. This year the team has won 60 medals so 
far. How many of these have been won by short athletes? 
   
*Items based on Frederick’s longer CRT scale 
 Item based on Van Dooren, De Bock, Hessels, Janssens and Verschaffel (2005) 
 
 
